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腹Summary腺 
 
In this paper, we will conduct an analysis from an empirical perspective concerning 
broadcasting demand behavior and characteristics. More concretely, we will assume 
three options (subscription patterns), namely, nonsubscription, cable TV 
subscription, and subscription to broadcasting services via communications 
satellites (CS), and we will conduct an analysis of broadcasting service demand 
behavior using a discrete choice model. 
 
According to our result, price elasticity is low for cable TV and CS subscribers, 
which is a contrast to the United States, where price elasticity for paid broadcasting 
is high. It shows that factors other than price continue to have a strong influence on 
demand behavior (subscription choices) in the Japanese market for regular and 
paid broadcasting (the multichannel market) and that the market has not yet 
entered the phase of price competition between cable TV and CS broadcasting.     
 
With regard to channel number elasticity, the figures are high for basic channel 
service and low for special channel services. This indicates that basic services are 
an important concern for viewers. This suggests that, in line with reports that the 
spread of cable TV in the United States was promoted by difficulty in receiving 
terrestrial broadcasts, basic channel services may be more important than special 
channels as keys to the spread of paid broadcasting in Japan. 
 
 
Keywords: Subscription demand, Broadcasting service, Pay-TV, Discrete choice 
model, Price/Channel elasticity 
 






In order to evaluate the effects on the welfare of broadcasting services resulting from 
the shift to multichannel broadcasting, it is necessary to clarify the structure of demand 
for broadcasting services in the context of this switch. It has also been noted that 
“desirable” market conditions for the maximization of social welfare, funding 
approaches (public, commercial, and paid broadcasting), levels and structures of 
competition (including monopoly, oligopoly, and competitive markets) all depend greatly 
on demand-side features, such as substitutability among programs and channels.1 
  Analyses of demand for broadcasting services include ones that focus on the 
measurement of their economic value and ones that focus on evaluation of competitive 
conditions in the broadcasting market; in the United States the latter sort have been 
more commonly conducted as part of antitrust/competition policy. In particular, against 
the backdrop of the further intensification of competition with the spread of satellite 
broadcasting and the entry of cable companies and regional telephone companies into 
the market, in recent years analyses have been directed at the cable TV market and 
DBS (direct broadcast satellite) broadcasting.2  Kieschnick and McCullough (1998) 
made the following three points about the policy utility of demand analyses of 
broadcasting services: 
  (i) They offer grounds for judgment in discussion of the position of terrestrial 
broadcasting as the only medium that allows non-affluent households to watch 
programs and of the maintenance of universal service and public utility. 
  (ii) They offer grounds for judgment concerning media concentration and 
business efficiency in connection with the FCC’s (Federal Communications 
Commission’s) ownership rules concerning regional broadcasters, including the 
question of whether cable stations should be taken into consideration or not.   
  (iii) They offer grounds for judgment about policy measures (intervention) 
aimed at maintaining local terrestrial broadcasters—such as the idea that imposing a 
“must carry” rule on cable TV and satellite broadcasters does not ensure the financial 
                                                  
1  Spence and Owen (1977). 
2  Karikari et al. (2003) conducted an analysis of the factors behind spread of paid broadcasting, taking 
DBS broadcasting into account, showing that it progressed in areas where cable TV charges were high 
because of regulation and did not progress in areas where the entry of cable companies and regional 
phone companies had created intense competition. Also, Goolsebee and Petrin (2004), using subscriber 
data in a discrete choice model, estimated the own-price elasticity and cross-price elasticity of cable 
service (basic and premium) against DBS broadcasting and terrestrial broadcasting. They showed that 
demand for premium cable service and for DBS broadcasting was much more elastic than that for 
basic cable service, and that subscribers saw DBS and premium cable as substitutable services.  4
health of all (terrestrial) broadcasters, but it does aim for the survival of a basic number 
of broadcasters—and about market neutrality (competitive environment).3 
  Given the fact that the spread of cable TV has already created a multichannel 
broadcasting market in the United States, it may not be possible to apply arguments 
advanced there to today’s Japan without modification. But there is an undeniable 
possibility that points like the market environment, business efficiency, media 
concentration, and the “national minimum” may also become issues here. In particular, 
it seems quite plausible that points like business efficiency and media concentration 
(item ii above) and the promotion of a multichannel market and the maintenance of a 
national minimum (item iii above) will fully merit consideration in Japan.4 In  this 
paper, we will conduct an analysis from an empirical perspective concerning 
broadcasting demand behavior and characteristics, including the move toward 
multichannel broadcasting and subscription activity in paid broadcasting, taking into 
account the progress toward multichannel broadcasting. 
  Section 2 of this chapter sums up the characteristics of broadcasting service 
demand. Section 3 explains the methodology of our empirical study. Section 4 presents 




2. Broadcasting Service Demand Behavior 
 
The relationship between the shift to multichannel broadcasting and broadcasting 
service demand behavior has not been made entirely clear up to this point. In this 
section, prior to our empirical analysis, we will sum up this behavior with a focus on 
multichannel broadcasting. 
  Broadcasting service demand has two aspects: viewing decisions and the 
purchase of channel subscriptions. Purchasing channel subscriptions does not in itself 
produce any direct utility; utility only achieved through viewership. The level of utility 
rises with the increase of viewing time (volume of use), and marginal utility tends to 
diminish; in these respects broadcasting service demand is like demand for ordinary 
goods and services. If viewing time is taken as a given, then the level of utility rises with 
the viewing of programs that are close to the preferences of the viewers. Particularly in 
                                                  
3  Turner Broadcasting System Inc. v. FCC, 117 Sup. Ct. 1174 (1997). 
4  In some respects this sort of consideration has already begun, as in the review of the principle of 
nonconcentration, but there is room for further discussion of issues like the position of paid 
broadcasting.  5
the case of broadcasting services, which the suppliers offer unilaterally within short 
periods, there is an issue of probability involved in viewers’ being able to see the sort of 
programs that they prefer, but the larger the number of available channels is, the better 
the chances are that they will be able to find programs matching their preferences. So it 
would seem that increasing the number of channels available (i.e., increasing diversity) 
should increase users’ utility per viewing hour. And we can think of the utility function 
as a function of the number of channels and the amount of viewing time.   
  As limiting conditions, with respect to the purchase of channel subscriptions, it 
would seem that the same sort of budgetary constraints would apply as in the case of 
the use of ordinary goods and services, while with respect to viewing, inasmuch as this 
is a time-consuming leisure service, time constraints act as important limiting 
conditions. So we may consider that broadcasting services demand (viewing time and 
channel purchases) behavior should be formulated in the shape of the double 
constraints of budget and time.5  
  Above we have assumed that channels and cost burdens can be freely chosen, 
but it is probably appropriate to view the choice as involving the provision of channel 
services that have been packaged to some degree. Particularly in Japan’s case, 
purchasing a TV set and paying reception fees6  allows one to use basic channel services; 
selection of channel services to which one is not yet subscribed, along with the 
acceptance of cost burdens, is conducted through discrete choices to subscribe to paid 
broadcasting services based on comparison of the available channels and cost in the case 
of nonsubscription against the available channels and cost in the case of subscription. 
Based on this perspective, here we will assume three options (subscription patterns), 
namely, nonsubscription7, cable TV subscription, and subscription to broadcasting 
services via communications satellites (CS),8  and we will conduct an analysis of 
broadcasting service demand behavior using a discrete choice model.9†
                                                  
5  For the relationship between a specific broadcasting demand model and an empirical model, see 
Shishikura et al. (2005). 
6  These may be considered a sort of fixed charge. 
7  This is defined to include those households that use public broadcasting (including broadcasting 
satellite, or BS, services and terrestrial commercial broadcasting. 
8  Note that these options are not entirely mutually exclusive. 
9  In the discrete choice model, a consumer is assumed to acquire utility from various features (price, 
quality, content) of a good. It is further assumed that utility  in U   can be expressed as the linear 
combination of  in V , a deterministic term explained by the above features, and stochastic terms  in ε , 
with actor n choosing among a set of alternatives  n A
  in such a way as to maximize his or her utility. 
The conditions for actor n to choose alternative i are expressed as follows:   
in in in jn jn jn UV UV ε ε =+> =+
† i j ≠
腁 n jA ∈
 
Multiple estimation methods exist, depending on what sort of distribution is assumed for the above  6
3. Empirical Choice Model of Broadcasting Services Demand 
 
We assumed the following linear function for deterministic term Vin (Model 1). 
 
11 2 3 1 1 in i CATV i i i i i ANT n VD B c h E c h M c h p D Y α βββϕ δ == =+ + + + +  
 
We use the number of channels in three categories of service, namely, basic ( i Bch ), 
extended basic ( i Ech ), and special ( i Mch ), as the basic attribute variable for the various 
subscription states, and charges (amount paid,  i p ) as the variable indicating the cost 
burden.10  iC A T V D =  and  iA N T D =   are dummy variables that are equal to 1 when 
subscribed to cable TV and when not subscribed to paid broadcasting, respectively. We 
also include household income ( n Y ) as a household-specific attribute.11  The data are 
non-aggregated data12  from a questionnaire survey.13  See Table 1 for the descriptive 
statistics for each of the variables. We also conducted an estimation for a case where 
viewing time for each category is included (Model 2), namely, basic ( i Bwatch ), extended 
basic ( i Ewatch ), and special ( i Mwatch ), as the variable indicating viewing preferences.14 
 
11 2 3 1 2 3 1 1 in i CATV i i i i i i i i ANT n V D Bch Ech Mch Bwatch Ewatch Mwatch p D Y α βββγ γ γ ϕ δ = = =+ + + + + + + +  
 
  To sum up the conditions for the attribute variables for each type of 
subscription status, those who choose nonsubscription have access only to the basic 
                                                                                                                                                  
stochastic terms.   
10  “Basic” service refers to public broadcasting channels providing “comprehensive programming” 
(including education, news, and entertainment) and commercial channels. “Extended basic” refers to 
public and commercial channels transmitted by broadcast satellite (digital and analog). “Special” 
refers to channels providing special programs, such as films and music. 
11  We also looked at other attributes, such as the number of household members and their average age, 
but we did not find any significant results, so we have omitted them here.   
12  The average value is used for the attributes of alternatives that were not chosen, but since the 
numbers of channels available to nonsubscribers and to cable TV subscribers vary from region to 
region, regional averages were used as the opportunity number of viewable channels for 
nonsubscribers and cable TV subscribers. The average for the entire sample was used for CS 
subscribers, because there are no regional differences in this service. 
13  The survey was conducted in March 2004 by the Institute for Information and Communications 
Policy (IICP) and the Foundation for MultiMedia Communications (FMMC), directed at households in 
Tokyo and surrounding prefectures and in the Hokuriku region. Note that the geographical target was 
limited to these two regions; also, prior adjustments were made in order to secure a certain number of 
subscribers for sampling. Weighting was applied in such a way as to match the nationwide spread of 
services in setting the sampling shares for aggregation purposes, but we have some reservations about 
the estimation results. For details see Shishikura et al. (2005). 
14  We also made estimates for cases that allowed for regional variables, such as dummies for each 
prefecture and a regional (Hokuriku) dummy, as well as for household attributes, such as the number 
of household members, but we did not find significant results for any of these, so we have omitted them 
here.  7
channels,15  and their cost burden consists of payment of the reception fees collected by 
public broadcaster NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation). Those who choose cable TV 
subscription have access to additional basic channels and also to special channels, and 
their cost burden consists of the cable TV charges in addition to the NHK charges.16 
Those who choose CS service have access to special channels in addition to the basic 
channels available to nonsubscribers, and their cost burden consists of the NHK 
charges plus the charges for the number of channels for which they have contracted. 
  The difference between cable TV and CS services is expressed in the numbers 
of additional basic and special channels to which they provide access and in the cost 
burden. The choice to subscribe to one or the other is made in consideration of the 
channels available to nonsubscribers and the users’ preferences and cost burdens with 
respect to the basic channels and special channels. 
 
------------------------------Insert Table 1 about here ------------------------------ 
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
Below we give an overview of the estimation results for three logit models, namely, 
multinomial, nested,17  and mixed, in our two discrete choice models (See table 2). With 
regard to the sign condition and statistical significance of each variable, basic channel 
service both satisfies the sign condition and achieves an adequate level of significance, 
while special channel service meets the sign condition but does not have a high level of 
significance. The coefficient of extended basic channel service fails to meet the sign 
condition and also has a low level of significance. With respect to level of charges, the 
sign condition is met in all cases, and the level of significance is adequate overall. 
 
------------------------------Insert Table 2 about here ------------------------------ 
 
  It is difficult to identify which of the three methods of estimation is most 
appropriate. Pseudo R2 (McFadden’s R2) is high in each model, and no major differences 
were found for the goodness of fit. Also, we conducted IIA (Independence from Irrelevant 
                                                  
15  The number of available basic channels varies, however, depending on whether the household has 
access to BS services, on the residential environment, and on the region (number of terrestrial 
channels). 
16  The degree of freedom of choice, however, is not high, and the charges are set under fixed-rate plans. 
17  For the nested structure we use (nonsubscription) vs. (cable TV vs. CS). In other words, we assume 
that households first decide whether or not to subscribe to paid broadcasting and, if they choose to 
subscribe, they then choose between cable TV and CS.  8
Alternatives) tests to determine the appropriateness of the assumption that the 
disturbances are independent and homoscedastic among the alternatives, but neither 
the Hausman test nor the likelihood ratio test for the model without the CS alternative 
showed any clear tendency (Table 3). Even in the mixed logit with relaxed constraints 
for dispersion of the parameters, the level of significance of the correlation parameters 
was not very high. Though there were some differences in estimation results among the 
methods, these were not great, so below we will focus our consideration mainly on the 
results for the mixed logit model, which has the least constraints and good significance 
of coefficients. 
 
------------------------------Insert Table 3 about here ------------------------------ 
 
  In Table 4 we present our calculations for the elasticity with respect to charges 
and channels. For charges, all the values are less than 1, indicating inelasticity. For 
channels, basic service shows an extremely high elasticity of more than 6, but special 
channel service shows extremely low elasticity of under 0.3. 
------------------------------Insert Table 4 about here ------------------------------ 
5. Implications 
 
Let us now sum up the implications of the above empirical results. With regard to price 
elasticity, it may be natural that price elasticity is low for nonsubscribers with no room 
for choice, but the figures for cable TV and CS subscribers are also on the low side, 
which is a contrast to the United States, where price elasticity for paid broadcasting is 
high.18  
  Price elasticity is a useful indicator of the progress of competition in a market, 
but we may take the above findings to show that factors other than price continue to 
have a strong influence on demand behavior (subscription choices) in the Japanese 
market for regular and paid broadcasting (the multichannel market) and that the 
market has not yet entered the phase of price competition between cable TV and CS 
                                                  
18  See Goolsbee and Petrin (2004). Though it is not possible to compare line by line, because the 
methods of estimation and the formulations are different, the elasticity values they find are in the 
range of 1.5 to above 2, which are high by comparison with the figures for Japan even after allowing for 
such differences.  9
broadcasting.19 
  With regard to channel number elasticity, the figures are high for basic channel 
service and low for special channel services. Though we should probably not consider 
concrete values to be certain, it does seem clear that there is a major difference in 
elasticity between the two.20  This is highly significant when considering cable and CS 
from the perspectives of their spread and the competition between the two. It suggests 
the possibility that the broadcasting market, including the paid broadcasting market, 
may be heavily impacted in the period to come depending on how basic channel services 
are (re)transmitted. It also suggests that in cases where there are differences in the 
numbers of basic channels that can be directly received because of geographical or other 
conditions, basic channel transmission may have an impact on the competition between 
cable and CS for subscribers.21 
  If we look at viewing times, we find that even among households subscribed to 
paid broadcasting, the basic channels (terrestrial broadcasts) still account for the 
overwhelming majority of hours; this indicates that basic services are an important 
concern for viewers. This suggests that, in line with reports that the spread of cable TV 
in the United States was promoted by difficulty in receiving terrestrial broadcasts, basic 
channel services may be more important than special channels as keys to the spread of 
paid broadcasting in Japan. 
 
                                                  
19  Own-price elasticity for CS and cable is high by comparison with that for nonsubscription, and the 
figures for the two are close; it is thus possible to judge that cable and CS are in somewhat of a 
competitive relationship regarding services and prices. 
20  The difference in elasticity between the two reflects the dearth of channels and the substitutability 
of the content provided. This may be taken to reflect the fact that basic channel services are provided 
generally on a comprehensive-programming basis, consisting largely of original content, while much of 
the content of special channel services competes with other services, such as packaged video, and the 
same programs are broadcast repeatedly. 
21  In terms of policy implications this may offer a certain perspective concerning the proper shape of 
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Expression Nonsubscribed Cable TV CS
腀 139 221 153
Basic 6.918 9.529 6.819
Extended 0.667 8.000 1.961
Special 0.000 19.718 21.606
1600.714 7471.639 5484.806
Basic 699.990 650.761 577.862
Extended 6.579 28.257 28.147
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Multinomial Nested Mixed Hausman Likelihood
Model 1 76.0% 76.2% 86.4% Dismissed (5% level) Cannot be dismissed
Model 2 77.0% 76.8% 87.1% Cannot be dismissed Cannot be dismissed
IIA test Method 14
 
 

















Model 1 ε Own ε Cross ε Own ε Cross ε Own ε Cross
Unsubscribed -0.138 0.049 8.059 -3.445 0.000 0.000
Cable TV -0.504 0.379 6.423 -7.593 0.189 -0.135
CS -0.450 0.192 7.660 -3.859 0.243 -0.108
Model 2 ε Own ε Cross ε Own ε Cross ε Own ε Cross
Unsubscribed -0.186 0.066 8.569 -3.642 0.000 0.000
Cable TV -0.677 0.508 6.818 -8.060 0.087 -0.062
CS -0.603 0.259 8.115 -4.111 0.111 -0.050
Price Basic channel service Special channel services